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WHEN AN EX CAN TAKE IT ALL: THE EFFECT—AND NONEFFECT—OF REVOCATION ON A WILL POST-DIVORCE
MOLLY BRIMMER *
The culture of marriage is changing. 1 Almost fifty percent of presentday marriages will end in divorce.2 Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the number of individuals choosing to defer marriage. 3 Often, the
decision to postpone marriage is triggered by a desire to be more financially
stable before tying the knot. 4 Although disheartening, the current statutory
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1. After decades of declining marriage rates, steady rates of divorce, distinct changes in the
“traditional” family structure, and volatile economic times, the American culture surrounding marriage has evolved into something that many members of “The Greatest Generation” would hardly
recognize. WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RECORD SHARE OF
AMERICANS HAVE NEVER MARRIED: AS VALUES, ECONOMICS AND GENDER PATTERNS CHANGE
4 (2014), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-MarriedAmericans.pdf. See generally TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998), particularly
the section on “Love, Marriage, and Commitment.” See also Nuala Calvi, What ‘War Brides’ of
the Greatest Generation Knew About Marriage, FOX NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/09/15/what-war-brides-greatest-generation-knew-aboutmarriage/; Brett McKay & Kate McKay, 7 Lessons in Manliness from the Greatest Generation,
THE ART OF MANLINESS (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.artofmanliness.com/2009/04/30/7-lessonsin-manliness-from-the-greatest-generation/.
2. Jasmin Palacios, Divorce in America [infographic], DAILYINFOGRAPHIC (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://dailyinfographic.com/divorce-in-america-infographic.
3. WANG & PARKER, supra note 1, at 4–5, 23. For women, the median age for a first marriage is twenty-seven; the median age for a first marriage for men is twenty-nine. Id. This is a
drastic change from 1960, where the median age for a first marriage was twenty for women, and
twenty-three for men. Id.
4. See generally id. According to the 2012 Pew Research Center study, twenty-seven percent of never-married individuals say they are not financially prepared for marriage, with thirty
percent saying that they have not found someone who has the qualities that they are looking for in
a spouse. Id. at 7, 30. Furthermore, never-married young adults aged twenty-five to thirty-four
are more likely to cite financial security as the main reason for not being currently married (thirtyfour percent of those ages twenty-five to thirty-four, compared with twenty percent of those thirtyfive and older). Id. at 14, 30. Among never-married women, seventy-eight percent say that finding a person with a steady job is very important to them in choosing a spouse or partner. For never-married men, forty-six percent share this view. Id. at 28. Finding someone who shares similar
ideas about raising children weighs more heavily for men, with seventy percent of men citing this
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scheme regarding wills post-divorce, coupled with an individual’s increased
likelihood of divorce, often results with the fruitful savings of these financially savvy individuals being left in the most unintended of hands.
This prudent estate planning nearly always includes a will—a legal
tool utilized as the last remaining “voice of the testator.” 5 When probating
a will, a court’s primary responsibility is to properly construe and apply testator intent. 6 Because the testator is no longer present to speak about his or
her wishes and elaborate on this intent, the law requires that the probate
court adhere stringently to the explicit language stated in the will. 7 Given
the frequency with which individuals fail to update their wills, however,
such a strict adherence to the text can prove disastrous when a testator fails
to change his or her estate plan.8 This situation can leave a testator’s current loved ones with nothing and an ex-spouse—whom the testator presumably no longer wants to receive a bequest or be named executor under the
will—with a windfall.
When finalizing a divorce, a couple’s first priorities usually include
the emotional and time-consuming issues of asset division, child custody,
child support, and alimony. 9 Changing their individual estate plans to reflect their new marital status is typically not at the forefront of their concerns. 10 To make matters more difficult, the inheritance consequences of an
outdated will do not become apparent until after the death of one of the
former spouses. 11 This leaves the decedent’s family and current spouse, if
there is one, with many unanswered questions, including whether the decedent intended for his or her former spouse to take the bequest included in
the original will. 12
The Uniform Probate Code’s (“UPC”) revocation upon divorce stat13
ute is a statutory response to this common failure to execute a new will
after divorce. The statute provides an express rule to clarify these unanas an important factor. Id. at 21. See also Erin Hayes, More Americans Waiting Longer to Marry,
ABC NEWS (June 29, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130884 (quoting the explanation of why a thirty-one-year-old soon-to-be bride waited to marry: “I wanted to be financially
secure . . . I would never want to depend on anybody.”).
5. Reasons to Challenge a Will, FINDLAW, http://estate.findlaw.com/wills/reasons-tochallenge-a-will.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Hailey H. David, Note, The Revocation-Upon-Divorce Doctrine: Tennessee’s Need to
Adopt The Broader Uniform Probate Code Approach, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 383, 384, 399 (2009)
(noting the situation “frequently” arises “in which a testator’s former spouse takes assets against
the testator’s wishes because the testator simply failed or did not have enough time to execute a
new will after the divorce”).
9. Id. at 384.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra note 14.
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swered questions and to resolve the problem of the unintended former
spouse beneficiary. This Comment will illustrate the complications that result when a state fails to fully adopt the clear bright-line standard set forth
in the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, Section 2-804. 14 A recent
Maryland Court of Appeals case, Nichols v. Suiter, 15 provides an instructive
example of the complications that can quickly arise without such a statute.
State legislatures that have not already done so should universally adopt the
statutory provisions set forth in the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute,
Section 2-804. This would promote the efficient resolution of probate administration, protect the common testator who fails to change his will upon
divorce, and better effectuate the new intentions of the divorced testator.
I. BACKGROUND
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’
(now known as the Uniform Law Commission) decision to promulgate the
UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute resolved a systematic inconsistency
in American estate jurisprudence. 16 The inconsistent state court decisions
regarding revocation upon divorce contrasted sharply with the Uniform
Law Commission’s executive goal of uniformity. 17 This Comment will
delve into this inconsistency, with the hope that such an analysis will exemplify why state courts should adopt the UPC’s recommended revocation
upon divorce statute. Part I.A will discuss the general purpose and development of the UPC. 18 Part I.B will then focus specifically on the rationale

14. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1) (2001). This section states, in pertinent part:
(b) [Revocation Upon Divorce.] Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: (1) revokes any revocable (A)
disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his [or her]
former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by
law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual’s former
spouse, (B provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral
power of appointment on the divorced individual’s former spouse or on a relative of the
divorced individual’s former spouse, and (C) nomination in a governing instrument,
nominating a divorced individual’s former spouse or a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian; and (2) severs
the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or
annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship [or as community property
with the right of survivorship], transforming the interests of the former spouses into
equal tenancies in common.
Id.
15.
16.
17.
18.

435 Md. 324, 78 A.3d 344 (2013).
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.A.
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and objective principles underlying Section 2-804. 19 The Comment then
conducts a jurisdictional case study, with each subsequent section addressing a different type of statutory scheme. Part I.C.1 will discuss jurisdictions
whose revocation upon divorce statutes mirror that of the UPC. 20 Part I.C.2
will examine jurisdictions that have failed to adopt a specific revocation
upon divorce statute and instead rely on general revocation statutes and a
couple’s property settlement agreements when probating the testator’s
will. 21 Part I.C.3 will evaluate jurisdictions that refuse to revoke any will
without an explicit revocation statute.22 Part I.C.4 will discuss the rare occurrence in which a jurisdiction will totally and explicitly abolish revocation upon any change in marital status.23 Part I.D will conclude the Background Section with an edifying case study analysis of the Maryland Court
of Appeals case, Nichols v. Suiter. 24
A. The Uniform Probate Code: History, Developments, and Purpose
Early American probate law developed in a haphazard and piecemeal
fashion. 25 Influenced by the English law that the colonial settlors brought
with them, states generally followed the standards set forth by the English
Statute of Frauds, the 1837 Wills Act, or some combination of the two. 26
Because the law in England remained largely inconsistent among different
localities, individual colonists would often bring a distinct local variation of
the law to America. 27 Thus, probate law varied widely from colony to colony and later, from state to state. 28
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) was established in 1892 to address these inconsistencies.29
Its goal was “to promote uniformity in the law among the several States on
subjects as to which uniformity is desired and practicable.”30 In 1940, Pro19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.C.1.
21. See infra Part I.C.2.
22. See infra Part I.C.3.
23. See infra Part I.C.4
24. See infra Part I.D.
25. Robert Whitman, Revocation and Revival: An Analysis of the 1990 Revision of the Uniform Probate Code and Suggestions for the Future, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1992).
26. Id. at 1039. The author notes that the development of wills in the American colonies was
influenced by “living English law,” those “norms and practices which developed indigenously, to
cope with new, special problems of life in the settlements,” as well as “those norms and practices
that the colonists adopted because of [their ideological beliefs].” Id. at 1039–40 (quoting
LAWRENCE FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 35 (2d ed. 1985).
27. Id. at 1039, n.32.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1041.
30. Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws Const. art. 1.2, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Constitution. The National Conference of
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fessor Thomas E. Atkinson suggested to the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law that the organization prepare a Model Probate Code; the Section did so in 1946. 31 Although it provided a basis for statutory revision in several states, fewer than
half of the states ever fully adopted the Model Probate Code. 32 In 1962, the
NCCUSL, along with the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate, and
Trusts undertook the Uniform Probate Code project. 33 After six years, the
NCCUSL and the ABA House of Delegates approved the UPC in 1969. 34
The primary purposes of the UPC are:
(1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents . . . ; (2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property; (3) to promote a speedy and
efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and
making distribution to his successors; (4) to facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; [and] (5) to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions. 35
In its simplest form, the UPC is designed to provide the state legislatures
with a set of standards that evince “predictability, provability, and correctness.” 36
The UPC has been amended a number of times since 1969, with the
most substantial revisions to the Code’s revocation sections occurring in
1990. 37 In 1990, the UPC drafters felt it necessary to “fine-tun[e]” the revCommissioners on Uniform State Laws is also known as the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”);
see also Frequently Asked Questions, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
COMMISSIONERS
ON
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS,
OF
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Frequently%20Asked%20Questions (last visited Jan. 5, 2014) (noting that the nonpartisan volunteer organization is the source of over 300 acts
that “secure uniformity of state law when differing laws would undermine the interests of citizens
throughout the United States”); EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 6 (1953) (noting that the American Bar Association, which was established in 1878, also states that one of its principle purposes is the promotion of “uniformity of
legislation”).
31. Stephanie J. Wilbanks, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow, But Does It Have to be So Complicated? Transmission of Property at Death in Vermont, 29 VT. L. REV. 895, 900 (2005).
32. Id.
33. Whitman, supra note 25, at 1042.
34. Wilbanks, supra note 31.
35. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b) (2001).
36. Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 901 (generalizing from the UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt.
2, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. 144). “[The UPC] provides a comprehensive and integrated set of rules
governing the transmission of wealth by will, by non-probate transfers, and by intestacy. It includes not only carefully crafted statutory provisions, but also detailed commentary explaining
those provisions.” Id. at 903.
37. Id. at 900–01. The Uniform Probate Code has been substantially revised in 1975, 1982,
1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2008, and 2010. Legislative Fact Sheet—
Probate Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS,
ON
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ocation upon divorce section in order “to give greater effect to the testator’s
actual intent, to deal with the problems that ha[d] surfaced in post-1969
case law, and to apply the rules governing probate transfers to non-probate
transfers.” 38 These changes reflected a modern desire to reduce strict adherence to the formalistic probate systems originally used in England, as
well as simultaneously provide the courts with a more efficient standard to
determine testator intent.39
B. Uniform Probate Code Section 2-804, the Revocation by Divorce
Statute: Background and Purpose
Beginning with the Model Probate Code in 1946, the NCCUSL has
consistently addressed revocation in their recommended proscriptions,
evincing the importance that drafters have placed on this concept.40 The
current version of the UPC revocation upon divorce statute, Section 2804(b)(1)(i), states:
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the
marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or
after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: (1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or
appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his [or
her] former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition
or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a
relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse.41
The current 1990 revision broadened the scope of the statute to include
revocation of certain will substitutes and trusts, such as revocable intervivos trusts, life insurance, retirement benefits, and annuities.42 It also extended revocation to any provisions in the testator’s will favoring the relatives of the former spouse. 43 This expansion of the statute demonstrates the
UPC drafters’ intent to create a more inclusive revocation statute that cohttp://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Jan.
14, 2015).
38. Whitman, supra note 25, at 1042–43. The revocation statute is now UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-804 (2001).
39. Whitman, supra note 25, at 1061. See also Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 901–02, 935
(noting that the revocation sections demonstrate a response to the decline of formalism in favor of
determining testator intent and that the 1990 revisions indicate that the UPC drafters were less
concerned with formalism and protecting the testator, but rather, once again, their primary focus
was on properly effectuating testator’s intent).
40. Whitman, supra note 25, at 1041–42. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09
(1975); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 (1982); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 (1987);
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-507-09 (1990).
41. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1)(i) (2001).
42. Id. § 2-804, comments.
43. Id.
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vers more situations and more people. The drafters’ decision to use such
specific language for its lone exception (“except as provided by the express
terms”) provides evidence that the drafters intended this to be a bright-line
rule that could only be trumped by an absolute and unequivocal statement
to the contrary. 44
C. Jurisdictional Case Study: Analyzing Different Statutory Schemes
Although the UPC drafters developed the current revocation upon divorce statute to serve as a recommended exemplar for state legislatures,
many states have not yet heeded the guided advice. This Section will discuss the various revocation schemas currently operational in state legislatures throughout the United States, and the implications that each respective
schema can have on an individual’s will.
1.

Case Law Illustrations: Jurisdictions with an Explicit
Revocation upon Divorce Statute

The UPC provides a bright-line standard for judges to utilize in interpreting the will of a testator who fails to change his will after a divorce.45
The provision mandates that a divorce automatically revokes any and all
dispositions favoring the former spouse. 46 A testator can provide for a former spouse only if this intention is specifically declared by the express
terms of the will. 47 A number of state jurisdictions have adopted statutes
that were influenced by this rule promulgated by the UPC. 48 A few states
even adopted statutes that revoked the entire will, as opposed to just the
provisions affecting the former spouse. 49 By choosing to follow the UPC’s
unambiguous standard, these states offer a clear and certain statute in an often-convoluted probate process. 50
The Erie County Surrogate’s Court of New York provides clear reasoning for adopting its unequivocal bright-line revocation upon divorce
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. See supra Part I.B.
46. See supra note 14.
47. See supra note 14.
48. According to the ULC, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Utah have all enacted the current version of the Uniform Probate Code in its entirety, including § 2-804, which applies the revocation upon divorce
doctrine. Legislative Fact Sheet—Probate Code, supra note 37.
49. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76 (West 1996). However, this Georgia law was replaced in 1996 by GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-49, which provides that a divorce no longer revokes the
testator’s will completely, but rather results in the former spouse being treated as having predeceased the testator. See comments to § 53-4-49 for legislative history.
50. See Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 947 (noting that adoption of the UPC revocation upon
divorce statute would “clarify unanswered questions in Vermont jurisprudence” regarding the effect of divorce on a will).
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statute in In re Will of Lampshire. 51 This was a case of first impression, yet
the court voiced strong support for the statute, noting that it was necessary
in light of the fact that “the public is lax in making or revoking their
wills.” 52 The court also thought the statutory presumption towards revocation was preferable, as it required the testator to take the affirmative steps
necessary to include the former spouse if so desired.53 Here, the New York
revocation upon divorce statute contained nearly the exact same language as
UPC Section 2-804, in that, according to the Statute, the testator must “expressly provide[] otherwise.” 54 The court found no alternate expressions of
intention to include the former spouse and held the will revoked. 55
Revocation upon divorce statutes have also been useful in determining
the effect and impact of a revocation. The Court of Appeals of Oregon held
in In re Estate of Crohn 56 that revocation of a will is not ambulatory, in that
whether or not a will is revoked does not depend on the law in effect at the
time of death, but rather depends on the law in effect at the trigger time of
revocation—the time of divorce. Accordingly, at the time of divorce, the
revocation of a will is “done and complete.” 57 Once revoked, a will cannot
be revived unless “new life is given to it.” 58 Here, the testator was divorced
in 1956, and, at the time, Oregon had enacted a statute revoking a testator’s
entire will upon divorce. 59 In July 1970, the state legislature repealed this
statute and replaced it with one providing that divorce only revoked those

51. 292 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1968).
52. Id. at 579; see id. at 579–80 (acknowledging the argument that such a strong statute was
unnecessary as a testator could simply alter his will after a divorce, the court still found this argument to be unconvincing).
53. Id. at 579.
54. Id. At the time, the statute read:
“(a) If, after executing a will, the testator is divorced, his marriage is annulled or its nullity declared or such marriage is dissolved on the ground of absence, the divorce, annulment, declaration of nullity or dissolution revokes any disposition or appointment of
property made by the will to the former spouse and any provision therein naming the
former spouse as executor or trustee, unless the will expressly provides otherwise.”
Id. at 579–80.
In 2008, New York enacted a new revocation upon divorce statute that even more closely
adheres to the language set forth by the UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2011). See N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney Supp. 2015) and the Editor’s Notes therein.
55. In re Will of Lampshire, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (noting that “the court should not make a
new will based on speculation as to what the testator might have intended” (quoting In re Estate of
Imperato, 254 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1964)).
56. In re Estate of Crohn, 494 P.2d 258 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
57. Id. at 259 (quoting Estate of Berger, 243 P.2d. 862, 865 (Cal. 1926)).
58. Id.
59. Id at 258–59; see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 114.130 (West 2013) (“A will made by any
person is deemed revoked by his or her subsequent divorce.”). This statute has since been repealed and replaced by OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.315 (2013).
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will provisions in favor of the former spouse. 60 The testator died in September of 1970. 61 His will gave his entire estate to his former spouse’s son
by a prior marriage. 62 The court held that a revocation upon divorce is a
“final and complete act.” 63 Because the divorce automatically revoked the
entire will at the immediate time of the divorce, it is of no concern that a
subsequent statute would not have revoked the will in its entirety. 64 Revocation cannot be repealed or revived. 65 Simply stated, the court found that
“what’s done is done.” 66
Courts often utilize a straightforward and bright-line revocation upon
divorce rule, particularly when faced with a set of contradictory facts. In In
re Estate of Pekol, 67 the testator executed her will in 1957, bequeathing all
her real and personal property to her husband.68 Although they divorced in
1961, the couple cohabited for thirteen years prior to her death in 1983.69
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District held the testators will
to be revoked, finding that the divorce decree “forever barred” her exhusband from claiming any part of her estate.70 Despite the couple’s thirteen-year-long cohabitation, the court asserted that there was “strong public
policy” favoring the institution of marriage.71
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Pence 72
found Missouri’s clear revocation standard instructive. In 1988, the couple
signed a will that included a provision not to revoke the will unless both
parties agreed to it. 73 Thirty years later, in 2008, the couple divorced. 74
The testator then died in 2009. 75 The court found that the revocation upon
divorce statute applied and the will was revoked. 76 Although the parties
seemingly had entered into a “contract” not to revoke the will, the contract
did not include any provision that clearly contemplated the potential for di60. In re Estate of Crohn, 494 P.2d at 259; see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.315 (2013) (“Unless a will evidences a different intent of the testator, the divorce or the annulment of the marriage
of the testator after the execution of the will revokes all provisions in the will in favor of the former spouse . . . .”).
61. In re Estate of Crohn, 494 P.2d at 259.
62. Id. at 258.
63. Id. at 259.
64. Id. at 260.
65. Id.
66. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 3, sc. 2.
67. 499 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
68. Id. at 89.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id at 90.
72. 327 S.W.3d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
73. Id. at 572.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 575–76.
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vorce. 77 The court relied on the state legislature’s decision that “a divorce
should wipe the slate clean as to the divorced spouse, without the testator
having to go to the time and expense of making a new will.”78 The court
also observed that, in almost every instance, a divorced person would not
desire a bequest to the former spouse to remain in effect.79 Therefore, such
a bequest would often result in an “inequitable windfall in favor of [the
former spouse].” 80 The court found that a divorce should instead have the
effect of “cutting off” all of the former spouse’s claims to the testator’s estate. 81
Particularly when faced with indeterminate and unusual relationships,
courts are prone to rely on an express and unequivocal statute. For example, the District Court of Appeal of Florida in Bauer v. Reese82 revoked a
husband’s will that was executed after the couple’s first marriage—even
though the couple had later remarried one another!83 The court found the
Florida statute to be “clear, concise and unambiguous.” 84 Furthermore, the
statute was enacted with a specific legislative purpose “unquestionably directed toward curing the incongruous situation . . . [wherein a] death[] occur[s] before the testator has had an opportunity following divorce to reframe or destroy the existing will.” 85 Therefore, in light of the divorce, the
court held the will to be null and void, and the decedent was left to die intestate. 86
A bright-line standard can also facilitate straightforward resolutions to
complex probate disputes. Gibboney v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 87 is one such
example. In Gibboney, the couple was married in 1975 and divorced in
1996. 88 The testator executed a will in 1973, which set forth four mutually
exclusive tiers of dispositions. 89 The first of these dispositions provided for
his “surviving wife, lawfully married to decedent on his death date” and the
fourth of which stated, “if none of the above persons survive decedent, to
77. Id. at 574–75.
78. Id. at 574 (quoting In re Bloomer’s Estate, 620 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Mo. 1981)).
79. Id.
80. Id at 575. The court also notes that the “law favors a statutory interpretation that tends to
avert unreasonable results.” Id. (quoting Miles v. Lear. Corp., 259 S.W.3d 64, 75 (Mo. App. E.D.
2008)).
81. Id. at 576.
82. 161 So. 2d 678 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
83. Id. at 679, 681.
84. Id. at 680.
85. Id. The court further reiterated the UPC’s preference for clear expressions of intent when
it stated, “if [the testator] desires the divorced spouse to participate in his estate, the better rule is
to require a new will to be executed to that effect.” Id.
86. Id. at 81.
87. 622 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
88. Id. at 164.
89. Id at 163–64.
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[name of his former spouse].” 90 The North Carolina revocation upon divorce statute states that “unless otherwise specifically provided,” the statute
revokes all provisions in the will in favor of the former spouse.91 The court
found that the residual disposition specifically providing for the former
spouse did not “expressly provide[]” for the case of a divorce. 92 Absent any
such express statement, the court found the will to be revoked. 93 Although
still not as explicit as the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, the statute
addressed in Gibboney possesses the same bright-line nature.
2. Case Law Illustrations: Revoked, Even Absent a Revocation
upon Divorce Statute
In a number of other jurisdictions, state legislatures have not provided
an explicit revocation upon divorce statute. Even in the absence of such a
statute, courts often hold that a divorce will revoke a testamentary provision
in favor of the testator’s former spouse. In this situation, courts are prone to
rely on both the couple’s divorce property settlement 94 and the state’s general statute providing for revocation upon subsequent change of circumstances. Even without a statute explicitly providing for revocation upon divorce, it is interesting to note that the judicial outcomes remain largely
consistent with the UPC’s guidelines. This trend is significant as it suggests
that an absolute revocation post-divorce is the outcome to which judicial
courts seek. Full adoption of the explicit UPC revocation upon divorce
statute would therefore simply minimize any isolated instances of autonomous judicial discretion, as well as enhance consistent results and create
statutory authority for judicial decisions.
Without a revocation upon divorce statute, courts may still attempt to
revoke a will post-divorce. In Caswell v. Kent, 95 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine relied on Maine’s general revocation upon subsequent
changes statute 96 and recent decisions of their fellow courts to revoke the

90. Id.
91. See N.C. GEN.STAT. § 31-5.4 (LexisNexis 2013) (emphasis added).
92. Gibboney, 622 S.E.2d at 165.
93. Id. at 165.
94. See Kristen P. Raymond, Double Trouble—An Ex-Spouse’s Life Insurance Beneficiary
Status & State Automatic Revocation upon Divorce Statutes: Who Gets What?, 19 CONN. INS. L.J.
399, 421–23 (2013) (noting that some jurisdictions hold that a property settlement agreement essentially “wipes the slate clean” between divorcing spouses, revoking all benefits, while others
hold that the determination of whether a property settlement agreement suffices for revocation
depends on such factors as the wording and express terms of the agreement).
95. 186 A.2d 581 (Me. 1962).
96. Id. at 581. The statute states that a will could be revoked by operation of law when “subsequent changes in the condition and circumstances of the maker” occurred. Id. The court noted
that while divorce, if anything, should be considered a “subsequent change” that would properly
and realistically produce a revocation, the “courts have held with almost complete uniformity that
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testator’s will. 97 The court concluded that, when a divorce involves a property settlement, a conclusive presumption arises that the testator intended a
revocation of the testamentary provision favoring his former spouse. 98 In
making this assumption, the court noted that “it is so rare and so unusual”
for a divorced testator to desire or intend that his former spouse benefit under his will. 99 Furthermore, the court found that it is reasonable for the
court to require a divorced testator to make such an atypical desire and intention manifestly evident either by a properly executed codicil to the current will or by the execution of a new will. 100 The court further declared
that its adoption of an “absolute and irrebuttable statutory revocation” is
necessary in order to eliminate excessive litigation, uncertainty, and unnecessary confusion. 101 This would provide both protection, as well as notice
to the ordinary testator, that affirmative action is required if he desires to
include his former spouse as a beneficiary. 102
Similarly, at the time Rankin v. McDearmon 103 was decided, the state
of Tennessee had no statute governing the revocation of wills, nor any prior
case law governing the question. 104 The Court of Appeals of Tennessee,
however, did note the firmly established common-law doctrine of implied
revocation when applied to a marriage coupled with the birth of child. 105
The court analogized and held that a divorce, coupled with a property settlement, should have a similar result.106 Because a testator did not anticipate these events at the time of his will execution, the court found that a
divorce alone, unaccompanied by a property settlement, will not produce a revocation by operation of law.” Id. at 582.
97. Id. at 584.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 582–83.
100. Id. The court also relied on the language of Lansing v. Hayes, wherein the majority stated: “To hold the will unrevoked under these circumstances would be repugnant to that common
sense and reason upon which law is based. . . . Such disposition of his property . . . would be unusual, and contrary to common experience.” Id. at 582 (quoting Lansing v. Hayes, 54 N.W. 699,
701 (Mich. 1893).
101. Id. at 584.
102. Id. (predicting that “incidents of such desire and intention will be rare indeed”).
103. 270 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).
104. Id. at 662. Tennessee has since adopted a revocation upon divorce statute; effective
2007. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-202 (LexisNexis 2007).
105. See Rankin, 270 S.W.2d at 662–63 (“[M]arriage and birth of a child after the execution of
a written will will constitute an implied revocation of such will . . . .”). The court also noted:
[H]ere the property rights of the parties to a divorce action have been settled in contemplation or anticipation of a divorce, such a settlement followed by a divorce impliedly
revokes a prior will of one spouse in favor of the other, at least as to the legacies or devises bequeathed the spouse. Such circumstances have been held conclusive of revocation rather than as merely raising a rebuttable presumption of revocation.
Id. at 663 (quoting 57 AM. JUR. 371 Wills § 536 (1953)).
106. See id. at 663 (clarifying that a marriage or the birth of a child alone will not constitute an
implied revocation; equally, a divorce or a property settlement would not suffice).
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conclusive presumption should exist that the testator would not want his
will to stand after these events occurred.107 Here, the couple was married
for twenty-three years before obtaining a divorce, during which the couple
executed a property settlement. 108 Because these two events reflect such a
significant change in the domestic life of the testator, the court found that a
divorce coupled with a property settlement should “sever[] all ties” between
the spouses. 109
Likewise, in In re Bartlett’s Estate, 110 the Supreme Court of Nebraska
reiterated the “well-established rule . . . that a divorce, coupled with a settlement of the property rights of the parties, is such a change of circumstances as to work an implied revocation.” 111 The court found that the Nebraska statute extended revocation to cases beyond merely those covered by
common law. 112 As such, the court held that a statute calling for revocation
upon a changed set of circumstances is a “rule of justice and a principle that
the court should recognize and apply, whenever the change in the conditions or relations of the testator should . . . raise a clear presumption that the
testator would have desired to make a revocation, had his attention been directed to it.” 113 Accordingly, the court found that any claim or share that a
former spouse may have in a testator’s estate is destroyed. 114 The dissent
placed great weight on the specific facts of the case—here, the divorce resulted from the husband’s breach of marriage vows—and claimed that there
was a strong argument that the husband did intend to keep his former
spouse in the will. 115 However, if the legislature were to adopt a bright-line
rule, such as the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute, rather than rely on

107. Id.
108. Id. at 661.
109. Id. at 663.
110. 190 N.W. 869 (Neb. 1922).
111. Id. at 869.
112. See id. at 870 (“The statute, instead of attempting to preserve and provide for those specific revocations allowed at common law, we believe, sought to preserve and perpetuate the underlying principle only upon which those revocations were based.” That is, for women, the marriage alone would work to revoke her will and, in the case of a man, marriage and birth of issue
would have been necessary to revoke his will); see also Hertrais v. Moore, 88 N.E.2d 909, 910
(Mass. 1949), and In re Battis, 126 N.W. 9, 11 (Wis. 1910), where the courts discussed what constituted implied revocation at common law.
113. In re Bartlett’s Estate, 190 N.W. at 870 (finding this presumption to be clear in the case
of a divorce and claiming that “[i]t is beyond reason to suppose that a husband, after a divorce
and settlement of property rights, should still desire that a will, which he had previously made in
favor of his wife, should continue, and that his estate should pass to her under the will, to the exclusion of his natural heirs”).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 871 (Aldrich, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.B and Part II.C. when considering the
dissent’s interpretation; see also Part II.A. for alternative options that the testator could have utilized in order to effectuate this presumed intent.
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a discretionary standard, the court’s dissent could have avoided such a
complex, fact-driven inquiry.
In In re Battis, 116 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was able to avoid
such an inefficient analysis. Although the former wife offered evidence that
the testator maintained a friendly relationship with her, showed her affection through his actions, and publicly declared that he executed a provision
in his will for her, the court still held the provisions in the will relating to
the former spouse had been revoked. 117 The court asserted that a divorce
and subsequent property settlement produces a “complete destruction of
[the couple’s] legal and moral relations and consequent obligations and duties.” 118 Not only does a divorce decree make a former husband and wife
“strangers” to one another, but the property settlement also operates to “discharge” all moral and legal duties from one spouse to the other.119 Therefore, an absolute revocation of any provisions favoring the former spouse
should be revoked. 120
Lang v. Leiter 121 illustrates the complications that can arise when relying on judicial interpretation and a separate, unrelated document to probate
a will. In Lang, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Wood County reiterated
the rule that a divorce, coupled with a full settlement of property rights, impliedly revoke a will. 122 In this case, however, the couple had not executed
a complete and full property settlement agreement, but rather, a separation
agreement that only provided for a restoration of their individual and separately owned property. 123 Thus, the court found no “voluntary arms-length
separation agreement” that implied an intent to wholly revoke the will and
reversed the revocation. 124
3. Case Law Illustrations: If No Explicit Statute, No Revocation
Many states have not codified the doctrine of revocation upon divorce.
Although some of these jurisdictions generally reflect judicial outcomes
that are similar to that which would occur under the UPC, 125 others hold

116. In re Battis, 126 N.W. 9 (Wis. 1910).
117. See id. at 12 (“A divorce and settlement of their property rights between husband and
wife operates ipso facto to revoke his will previously made, and no subsequent act of the testator
not accompanied by the solemnities requisite for the making of a valid will, will revive it.” (quoting Wirth v. Wirth, 113 N.W. 306, 307 (Mich. 1907))).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 144 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 1956).
122. Id. at 333–34.
123. Id. at 332, 334.
124. Id. at 334.
125. See supra Part I.C.2.
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that a divorce, with or without a property settlement, does not automatically
revoke the testamentary provisions in favor of the former spouse.
For example, in Hertrais v. Moore, 126 the couple received an absolute
decree of divorce that included a full property settlement. 127 The Massachusetts state legislature had enacted a general statute providing for revocation of the entire will in the case of subsequent changes in the condition or
circumstances of the testator. 128 Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court
still held that the testator’s will favoring the former spouse remained valid
and was not revoked. 129 The court relied on the common law interpretation
of the statute, finding that a revocation of the entire will is “limited to
[those] very small number of cases at common law.” 130 Stressing that it
would be a serious matter to invalidate a will based on the presupposed
changed intention of a “reasonable testator,” the court found it more favorable to avoid an absolute revocation.131 The court also warned against explicitly including divorce in its general revocation statute—presaging that
other additions could be adopted that would expose testators to the risk of
unintended revocation. 132
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Michigan in In re Estate of Mercure 133 found that an implied revocation arises upon a change of the testator’s condition or circumstances.134 This decision reflects the “natural” presumption that the testator intended to revoke these provisions of his will. 135
However, the court held that this was not a “conclusive presumption,” nor
should the doctrine of “conclusive presumption” even exist. 136 Instead,
when faced with sufficient evidence tending to rebut the presumption of
revocation, all such evidence must be considered before a court determines
that a will is revoked. 137 The court held that any simple change of condition
or circumstances alone should not automatically revoke a will.138
126. 88 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1949).
127. Id. at 909.
128. Id. at 909–10. Massachusetts has since repealed this statute. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. 190B § 2-508 (West 2012) for the current version.
129. Hertrais, 88 N.E.2d at 912.
130. Id. at 911. See supra note 105. The court also noted that previous case law established
that the death of the wife of the testator, which occurred prior to testator’s own death, did not
qualify as a change in condition or circumstances such to revoke his will. Hertrais, 88 N.E.2d at
911 (citing Bennett v. Brown, 110 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1915)).
131. Hertrais, 88 N.E.2d at 912.
132. Id.
133. 216 N.W.2d 914 (Mich. 1974).
134. Id. at 919.
135. Id. at 918.
136. Id. at 916–17, 919. The court noted its agreement with the finding of an implied revocation in Lansing v. Haynes, 54 N.W. 699, 700 (1893), which decided that a divorce and property
settlement raised a strong presumption that there was an intention to revoke the prior will.
137. In re Estate of Mercure, 216 N.W.2d at 919.
138. Id.
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In In re Estate of Mercure, the testator drafted a will devising his estate to his soon-to-be former spouse. 139 He executed this will one day after
filing the property settlement, but two months prior to the final divorce decree. 140 Although his former wife went on to marry another man, the three
individuals became cordial neighbors, interacting socially and helping one
another financially. 141 Additionally, the testator carried an identification
card requesting that his former wife be the contact notified in the case of an
emergency. 142 The court found that the accumulation of this circumstantial
evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of revocation and therefore, found the will to be valid.143
In the Mercure opinion, the court expressed a hope for future legislation that is particularly illuminating. The court not only declared that a
statutorily enacted revocation doctrine would increase efficiency, but it also
asserted “[o]ur duty would be different,” implying that the court could have
reached a different conclusion in this case, if not for the lack of such a statute. 144 Stating that a legislatively enacted statute would have “the advantage of eliminating uncertainty and minimizing litigation,” the court
maintained that the status of a doctrine established by judicial common law
can only be maintained by the discretion of the judiciary. 145
4. Case Law Illustration: Total Abolishment of Revocation upon
Change in Marital Status
Over the past century, a small minority of jurisdictions abolished their
marital revocation statutes. However, in more recent years, the trend has
come full-circle; state legislatures have once more returned to the revocation statutes, concluding that the dissolution of marriage suffices as a significant enough change in circumstance to revoke a testator’s will.
This process is illustrated in Lee v. Central Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 146
in which the court discussed the reasons for the legislature’s recent decision
to abolish the revocation statute. 147 Prior to 1965, the Illinois revocation
statute provided that a change in marital status revoked a will.148 However,
139. Id. at 916.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court’s opinion notes how the three ate meals and participated in social activities
together, the testator paid his former wife’s telephone bills, and the former wife occasionally cared
for the testator in times of sickness. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 919.
144. Id. at 916.
145. Id. (noting that a legislatively enacted statute cannot be found to be a “wholly unreasonable law” and thus, “would withstand attack as an arbitrary or capricious statute”).
146. 296 N.E.2d 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 308 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. 1974).
147. Id. at 83.
148. Id.
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in 1965, the Illinois legislature decided to alter the revocation statute to
provide that “[n]o will or any part thereof shall be revoked by any change in
the circumstances, condition or marital status of the testator.” 149 The court
noted that the legislature’s intent was to “rectify inequitable situations such
as the case before this court.”150 This outlook was short-lived. The Illinois
legislature reversed this decision in 1975, thereby reinstating the revocation
doctrine when applied to the dissolution of marriages. 151
D. Case Law Model: Nichols v. Suiter—A Case of Mix-Up in
Maryland
A recent Maryland Court of Appeals case, Nichols v. Suiter, 152 provides an illustrative example of the complications that arise when a state
fails to fully adopt the bright-line UPC standard. In Nichols, the couple
married in 1965, separated in 1996, and divorced in 2006. 153 As a part of
the separation agreement, the couple agreed to waive all rights to the other’s
estate. 154 However, the couple also provided that either party may still bequeath any part of his or her estate to the other. 155 Three years prior to the
final divorce, the decedent executed his will, leaving the entire residue of
his estate to his former wife, indicated by her specific name. 156 The decedent died shortly after the will was finalized in 2006, and his will was admitted to probate.157 The Maryland revocation statute states that a divorce
will revoke all provisions in the will relating to the former spouse “unless

149. Id.
150. Id. Here, the decedent had executed a will in 1949. In 1962, she married. Prior to marriage, the couple entered into a verbal agreement to disclaim all interest in any property the other
owned. After their marriage, the couple recognized this agreement in a written agreement executed in 1964. The court found, reluctantly, that the ante-nuptial agreement was void based on the
prior revocation statute. Id. at 82, 84.
151. The current Illinois revocation statute reads, in pertinent part:
No will or any part thereof is revoked by any change in the circumstances, condition or
marital status of the testator, except that dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of the marriage of the testator revokes every legacy or interest or power of appointment given to or nomination to fiduciary office of the testator’s former spouse in a
will executed before the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration
of invalidity of marriage and the will takes effect in the same manner as if the former
spouse had died before the testator.
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-7 (West 2007).
152. 435 Md. 324, 78 A.3d 344 (2013).
153. Id. 328–29, 78 A.3d at 346–47.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 329–330, 78 A.3d at 347. Instead of simply identifying the bequest as to “my
wife,” the will provided, in pertinent part, “All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate and
property whether real, personal or mixed . . . I give, devise and bequeath unto Virginia Lee Suiters, if she survives me.” Id. at 355, 78 A.3d at 342.
157. Id. at 330, 78 A.3d at 347.
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otherwise provided in the will or decree.” 158 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and found that the statute’s language was clear and unambiguous. 159 Accordingly, the separation agreement’s general statement that either spouse could provide for the other, and
the fact that the decedent did, in fact, execute a will leaving parts of his estate to his former spouse, without referencing her status as “my wife,” did
not suffice to satisfy the statute’s requirement that the a testator must “otherwise provide[] in the will or decree” if he wishes to leave his estate to a
former spouse 160
Nichols v. Suiter is just one illustration of the contradictions and confusions that can occur when a state partially adopts the UPC’s clear and uniform language. 161 However, this issue is not restricted to just the state of
Maryland. 162 Problems of ambiguity, contradictions, or a total lack of statutory guidance are ubiquitous and are found across the jurisdictions of the
United States.
II. ANALYSIS
The current failure of some states to adopt the revocation upon divorce
doctrine has led to many inequitable and inconsistent judicial outcomes. 163
The frequency with which this issue arises has also created a call for legislative action. 164 Due to the growing complexity and fast pace of modern
life, individuals are often lax in modifying their wills to properly reflect
new, post-divorce intentions. 165 In addition, testators often suffer from a
misunderstanding that the divorce itself automatically revokes the will and
effects the requisite re-designation. 166 Unfortunately, this imposes a cost on
all of the parties to the probate process. First, without a consistent and express statutory guideline, courts are faced with an undesirable ultimatum:

158. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105 (West 2014).
159. Nichols, 435 Md. at 340, 78 A.3d at 353.
160. Id. at 340, 78 A.3d at 353–54. The court does acknowledge, “While the collective effect
may be to permit an inference as to the testator’s intent, it does not establish that intent or even
clearly and unequivocally state it.” Id. 340, 78 A.3d at 354.
161. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (2001). This section states, in pertinent part: “[e]xcept
as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument” (emphasis added).
162. See infra Parts I.C.1–4.
163. See supra Parts I.C.1–4.
164. See generally David, supra note 8; Wilbanks, supra note 31; Raymond, supra note 92;
Lynn, infra note 174; and Soliman, infra note 202.
165. See David, supra note 8, at 412 (noting that simple difficulties of modern life “often work
to prevent a testator from properly expressing his or her intent by modifying a will or will substitute”).
166. See Raymond, supra note 94, at 416 (asserting that jurisdictions that adopt a full and automatic revocation statute understand that a testator’s failure to change his will does not reflect an
intention to bequest his estate to an ex-spouse, but rather, is likely the result of an “inadvertent
misunderstanding” about the probate process).
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permit the court to infer testator intent (leaving whole discretion to individual probate judges) or mandatorily forbid the court from straying from the
will’s express (and outdated) terms. 167 This often results in inconsistent
outcomes. 168 Second, the surviving spouse and family are often left with
nothing. 169 Third, the testator also suffers in that his or her updated intentions post-divorce may not be fulfilled.170 Lastly, there is a strong constituent consensus and prevailing societal policy preference for clear, uniform,
and consistent statutory law. 171
The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute offers a solution. The revocation statute provides for the express revocation of all dispositions and
provisions favoring the testator’s former spouse, “except as provided by the
express terms” of the governing instrument.172 The states’ legislatures
should universally adopt the statutory provisions set forth in the Uniform
Probate Code’s revocation upon divorce statute, Section 2-804. This would
promote the efficient resolution of probate administration, protect the common testator who fails to change his will upon divorce, and better effectuate
the new intentions of the divorced testator.
A. Efficiently Resolve Estate and Probate Administration
There is an underwhelming amount of statutory and judicial guidance
regarding the impact of wills post-divorce. Adoption of the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute would reduce unnecessary legal challenges, as individuals could rely on a state’s explicit statutory guidance. 173 The current
ambiguity and inconsistency in probate courts enables and encourages litigation, with all its attendant expenses, costs, and delays. 174 Because there is
an unquestioned universal public interest in preventing litigation, a consistent revocation upon divorce statute would offer “welcome guidance” to
testators, beneficiaries, practitioners, and judges. 175 Under such a statute,
individuals could ensure the proper distribution of their property, judges
would have a standard to apply to the more complex and complicated pro167. See infra Part II.A.
168. See cases cited supra Part I.C.1–4.
169. See infra Part II.B.
170. See infra Part II.C; see David, supra note 8, at 412 (pointing out that, more often than
not, a testator’s intentions post-divorce will often differ substantially from those intentions held
while happily married).
171. See infra Part II.D; see Raymond, supra note 94, at 424–25.
172. See supra note 14 for the full text of UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2001).
173. Raymond, supra note 94, at 403; see also David, supra note 8, at 393 (noting that if Tennessee had fully adopted the UPC revocation provisions, certain issues “could have been disposed
of much more quickly”).
174. See Robert J. Lynn, Will Substitutes, Divorce, and Statutory Assistance for the Unthinking Donor, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 30 (1987) (mentioning that there is also an accompanying public
interest in honoring the decedent’s intent for his or her estate).
175. Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 917.
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bate cases that are unable to be administered under the statutory guidelines,
and the intended beneficiaries would receive their correct and intended
share. 176
Although adoption of the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute
would efficiently eliminate a large portion of unnecessary litigation, such a
complete abolition could come at a cost. Because the UPC provides for an
automatic revocation at the time of the divorce decree, a court would be unable to personalize judicial remedies when faced with unique circumstances. Therefore, there may be times where Section 2-804 may not best serve
the testator’s true intent. For example, in Nichols v. Suiter, the former
spouse argued that her deceased ex-husband’s intent was to bequeath the
entirety of his residuary estate to her. 177 However, because the will lacked
specific language stating that the testator intended this bequeath to remain
with his spouse, even post-divorce, the Maryland Court of Appeals found
the gift to be void. 178 Such a fixed hard-and-fast rule could prove detrimental when applied to convoluted and emotionally driven probate situations.
However, it is important to note that the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute offers only a “default rule.”179 This rule counterbalances the
problem of a stale will in the absence of a testator’s specific instruction otherwise. 180 A testator still has several options in order to provide for a former spouse. First, a testator may always write into his or her will that assets
should still benefit a spouse regardless of the dissolution of the legal marriage. 181 Second, a testator can simply execute another will after the divorce devising property to whomever he or she desires—including redesignating a former spouse as a beneficiary. 182 Because the revocation upon divorce provisions only apply to wills executed before a divorce, a testator could still provide for a former spouse, without any concern that these
dispositions of property will be revoked. 183 Third, in a testator’s original
draft of his or her will, he or she can generally state that the revocation upon
divorce statute should have no effect upon the disposition of his or her assets. 184 Although it could be argued that these options put an undue burden

176. Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 903. The author notes that the adoption of the UPC revocation statute would “clarify unanswered questions” in Vermont, where full adoption of the UPC’s
revocation upon divorce statute has not yet been adopted. Id. at 947.
177. 435 Md. 324, 78 A.3d 344 (2013); see discussion supra Part I.D. Based on the facts of
the case, this argument does have some merit.
178. Nichols, 435 Md. at 340, 78 A.3d at 353–54.
179. David, supra note 8, at 398–99.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 411.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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on the testator, the UPC’s revocation upon divorce doctrine provides an unrivaled remedy that will produce “more equitable results more of the
time.” 185
B. Protect the Common Testator from Unintended Consequences
The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute provides a “default plan”
based on the common and frequent situation wherein a divorced testator
fails to amend his or her estate plan post-divorce. 186 This failure to change
a will can be due to a myriad of reasons: simple forgetfulness, sudden and
unexpected death, failure to comply with proper procedure, bad legal advice, or daily responsibilities. 187 Furthermore, an everyday layperson, uneducated and unaware of the complicated intricacies of probate law, might
assume that a divorce, in and of itself, would automatically effect a change
in the distribution of his or her estate. 188 Regardless of the reasoning behind the testator’s failure to properly modify his will, substantial inequities
can result from this failure. 189
In addition, although the majority of the court decisions within jurisdictions without explicit revocation statutes fortuitously resulted in a revocation, the court’s opinion often noted that, in the absence of a property settlement or general statute, the court would not have reached such a result. 190
This is problematic. For instance, when following this logic, if a couple
fails to settle their property in its entirety or if a state fails to create a general revocation statute, no revocation would occur. Often, this would leave
assets to a former spouse—a situation the testator typically would not have
intended nor desired.
The UPC revocation upon divorce statute protects the testator from
these unintended consequences by providing a default rule that aligns with
the intent of the majority of individuals and ensures the proper distribution
of the testator’s assets. 191 The revocation statute “offer[s] more protection
to the divorced decedent” than the ambiguous statutes currently enacted in
185. Id. at 411–12.
186. Id. at 398–99, 384.
187. Id. at 410–11 (quoting Mark Davis, Note, Life Insurance Beneficiaries and Divorce, 65
TEX. L. REV. 635, 653 (1987)). David notes that this failure to amend a will is an “all-toocommon circumstance[]” that often leads to inequitable results. Id. at 411.
188. Raymond, supra note 94, at 416 (“[A]n insured’s failure to make a beneficiary change
does not necessarily mean he intended to give the proceeds to his ex-spouse, but rather could have
resulted from an inadvertent misunderstanding about the nature of the divorce process in that the
divorce itself did not effect a change in beneficiary status.”); see also David, supra note 8, at 399–
400 (discussing the UPC’s revocation provisions relating to a former spouse’s relatives and noting
that a testator “would likely assume that if the law revokes provisions to a former spouse, it would
also revoke provisions to a former spouse’s relatives under the same logic”).
189. Raymond, supra note 94, at 416.
190. See supra Part I.C.2.
191. See infra Part II.C.
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some states and far more protection for decedents residing in those jurisdictions with a total lack of any revocation statute. 192 A bright-line rule would
also permit estate planners and practitioners to quickly eradicate mistaken
beliefs and provide testators with a guaranteed way to achieve their personal intended plan.
C. Properly Effectuate and Execute Testator Intent
The primary goal of probate courts is to “ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the testator.” 193 Typically, a testator would not intend for a
former spouse to remain a beneficiary after his divorce. 194 Usually a “divorce itself” will provide enough evidence of such testator intent.195 However, without clear statutory guidance, the judiciary remains free to either
adhere to the express terms of the outdated will or infer the updated testator
intent. The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute resolves this ambiguity
and alleviates the pressure on the judiciary by providing a vehicle that automatically determines testator intent.
Unfortunately, when faced with unusual circumstances, the conclusive
nature of the UPC revocation upon divorce statute can simultaneously become a wholly erroneous presumption. For example, in In re Estate of
Mercure, the former couple remained close neighbors—interacting hospitably and assisting one another financially and socially. 196 Although the court
agreed that there was a “natural presumption” that a testator would intend to
rescind his bequest to a former spouse, it also found the relationship to be
so unique that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to rebut this presumption. 197 In re Estate of Mercure is an unusual set of circumstances
wherein the court was able to deliver an equitable judicial remedy. However, the court’s opinion still asserts its desire for a statutorily enacted revocation statute in order to eliminate uncertainty and minimize litigation.198 The
192. David, supra note 8, at 395. The author also notes that the “growing complexity and fast
pace of life often work to prevent a transferor from properly expressing his or her intent.” Id. at
412.
193. George Chamberlain, Annotation, Cause of Action to Probate Will Presumptively Revoked or Altered as Result of Marriage, Divorce, Birth, or Adoption, 28 CAUSES OF ACTION 563,
§ 2 (2014).
194. See Raymond, supra note 94, at 412 (asserting that the Colorado state legislature, in
adopting a revocation statute nearly identical to the UPC’s Section 2-804, understood that a testator’s failure to properly amend his insurance policy to remove his ex-spouse as a beneficiary was
not a calculated intention but a mere oversight); see also Lynn, supra note 174, at 18 (noting that
there is a legislative assumption that a testator’s failure to change his or her will is a mere matter
of oversight and not an intentional decision).
195. Raymond, supra note 94, at 416 (stating that the failure to amend a testator’s will “constituted a mere oversight because the execution of a final divorce decree exhibited the insured’s true
intent to revoke the ex-spouse’s beneficiary status”).
196. In re Estate of Mercure, 216 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Mich. 1974); see supra Part.I.C.3.
197. Id. at 918–19.
198. Id. at 916.
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court recognized that, without such legislation, the future of estate law is
left to the discretion of the judiciary. 199 The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute would provide the definitive guidance for which courts are
seeking.
In addition, it is significant to note that the UPC revocation upon divorce statute is only the “default rule.”200 The statute still allows for personalization of a testator’s estate. For example, the testator in In re Estate
of Mercure could have simply added a new amendment to his will, drafted
an entirely new will, or drafted his original will to specifically state that a
former spouse should still benefit even post-divorce—which would have
avoided the probate litigation process entirely. 201
Because the UPC offers a set of general guidelines, the UPC drafters
recognized that divorce usually constitutes “such a detrimental breakdown
in a relationship that automatic alterations to a divorced spouse’s testamentary plan were needed.” 202 Clearly, the principal purpose of executing a
will is to ensure that the proceeds of one’s estate go to the correct beneficiary. 203 Without a provision providing for an automatic revocation upon
divorce, these proceeds may end up in the hands of an ex-spouse—contrary
to testator intent. State legislators need to recognize that the realities and
complications of modern life necessitate the adoption of a revocation upon
divorce statute in order to meet the needs of their citizens. 204 States need to
acknowledge changing family dynamics 205 and adopt “rules that more accurately reflect the probable intent of decedents and the complex relationships
of the twenty-first century.” 206 The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute
provides a default rule that proves advantageous for the majority of testators, as well as simultaneously allows a testator with intentions that are distinct from the majority to personalize his will accordingly.

199. Id.
200. David, supra note 8, at 398–99; see also supra Part II.A.
201. Additionally, it should be noted that the testator executed his probated will just two
months prior to the divorce decree and one day after filing the property settlement. In re Estate of
Mercure, 216 N.W.2d at 916.
202. Suzanne Soliman, A Fair Presumption: Why Florida Needs a Divorce Revocation Statute
for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, 36 STETSON L. REV. 397, 400 (2007). The author
also notes that “[i]ndividuals’ tendency towards recalcitrance in creating or revising their wills
also prompted the reform.” Id.
203. Raymond, supra note 94, at 424.
204. Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 949 (noting that the “justification for change” lies in the need
to better facilitate and effectuate a decedent’s intent, Wilbanks believes this purpose can best be
accomplished by simplifying the will-drafting process).
205. See generally WANG & PARKER, supra note 1.
206. Wilbanks, supra note 31, at 949 (noting also that the “justification for change lies . . . in
the failure of existing Vermont law to meet the needs of its citizens”).
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D. Public Policy Preference for Clear, Uniform, and Consistent
Statutory Law
There is a strong and universal public policy preference for clear, uniform, and consistent statutory law. Unfortunately, in regards to probate jurisprudence, many state legislatures are falling short of this objective. 207
Many experts in American probate law criticize the lack of consistency both
between and within state courts. 208 Among these same experts, however,
there is near universal agreement that the UPC would offer clear and express guidelines to eradicate the inconsistencies and confusion. The UPC
provides “much needed clarity and certainty in the law,” and is “attractive
in its simplicity.” 209 Because probating an estate has the potential to have
significant implications for individuals, rules governing estate probate must
be “clear, strictly construed, and consistently applied.” 210 In addition, because the revocation issue only arises after the testator has died and can no
longer articulate his intent, a rule must be able to prevent confusion both
before death (when the testator is drafting his or her will), and after death
(in deciphering his intent). 211 The UPC’s revocation upon divorce doctrine
offers the perfect balance of straightforward guidance and proper effectuation of testator intent. Moreover, the UPC is a collaborative effort of commissioners from all jurisdictions, and thus, “its well-thought-out policy rationale [that] reflects modern social values, as well as various other
concerns,” makes it universally applicable to all American jurisdictions. 212
E. Comparison to Life Insurance Policies
The 1990 revision to the Uniform Probate Code broadened the reach
of the revocation upon divorce statute, extending it to non-probate assets,
including life insurance, retirement benefits, annuities, and trusts.213 Similar to the conflicting judicial decisions surrounding the distribution of a testator’s estate, the distribution of life insurance policies has become equally

207. See supra Parts I.C.1–4.
208. See, e.g., Soliman, supra note 202, at 418–19 (noting that the adoption of a revocation
statute would “promote consistency, something which is significantly lacking in many state probate codes today”).
209. Lynn, supra note 174, at 28 (noting that revocation statutes “simply eliminate” the possibility that an ex-spouse could benefit from her former spouse’s will); see also Wilbanks, supra
note 31, at 949 (noting that not only does the UPC offer statutory guidelines for direction, but also
provides reporter’s notes and decisions from other jurisdictions).
210. Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Divorce Settlement Agreements, The Problem of Merger or Incorporation and the Status of the Agreement in Relation to Decree, 67 NEB. L. REV. 235, 282
(1988).
211. Raymond, supra note 94, at 423.
212. Soliman, supra note 202, at 419.
213. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2001) and comments.
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as inconsistent. 214 However, many leading authorities in the field are advocating for full revocation of all non-probate assets, such as life insurance,
which would affect both the direct beneficiary, as well as additional third
parties. 215 Although more convoluted and intrusive on private contract
rights than the general revocation doctrine, many states have still chosen to
adopt the UPC revocation provisions related to life insurance policies. 216
The strong support for enacting the UPC’s revocation provisions as applied
to life insurance policies provides compelling justification for the seemingly
simpler and more straightforward adoption of the revocation upon divorce
doctrine as applied to probate assets.
The impetus to wholly adopt the UPC revocation upon divorce statute
stimulates particularly zealous discussion when contemplating life insurance policies. 217 This is largely because the life insurance industry significantly impacts both individual Americans and the United States economy as
a whole. 218 According to a 2012 report by the American Council of Life
Insurers, life insurance companies provided over $62 billion to life insurance beneficiaries in 2011.219 Two out of three American families—75 million total—depend on this financial and retirement security every year. 220
In addition, the life insurance industry invested $5.5 trillion into the U.S.
economy, accounting for more than one-third of America’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). 221

214. Compare Hollaway v. Selvidge, 548 P.2d 835 (Kan. 1976), Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v.
Palmer, 94 P.3d 729 (Kan. Ct App. 2004), Ping v. Denton, 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978), Stiles v.
Stiles, 487 N.E.2d 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986), and Bersch v. Van Kleeck, 334 N.W.2d 114 (Wis.
1983), with Lincoln Benefit Co. v. Heitz, 468 F.Supp.2d 1062 (D. Minn. 2007).
215. See generally David, supra note 8; Lynn, supra note 174; Raymond, supra note 94; Soliman, supra note 202.
216. See supra note 48 for the list of states and territories that have enacted the current version
of the Uniform Probate Code in its entirety, including UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2001).
217. See generally Raymond, supra note 94.
MUTUALFINANCIAL
GROUP,
218. See
Little
Known
Facts,
MASS
http://www.massmutual.com/home/lifeinsurance (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
219. Life Insurers Fact Book 2012, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, Table 5.2, Payments
from
Life
Insurance
Policies
(Dec.
5,
2012),
https://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact%20Book/Documents/fa
ctbook2012_entirety.pdf. The insurance industry paid out $62,132,000,000 in life insurance benefits. Id.
220. Facts About the U.S. Life Insurance Industry, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS
(July
2012),
https://www.acli.com/About%20ACLI/Documents/Facts%20About%20the%20US%20Life%20In
surance%20Industry_July2012.pdf.
221. Little Known Facts, supra note 210. The insurance industry has $5.492 trillion in life insurer assets. Life Insurers Fact Book 2012, supra note 211 at Figure 2.1, Growth of Life Insurer
Assets. America’s total U.S. Gross Domestic Product is $16.800 trillion. Data: GDP, THE
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
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What makes the distribution of life insurance policies particularly
complicated is the common understanding that a life insurance constitutes a
separate contract between the insured policyholder and the insurance company. 222 Because the policy is viewed as private contract, the life insurance
company has a contractual duty to uphold the terms of the insurance contract—which means paying the policy proceeds to the insured’s designated
beneficiary. 223 As a contract, the beneficiary’s claim is wholly unrelated to
the spousal status of the couple, and rather stems from the precise terms of
the insurance policy issued. 224 This contractual duty to execute the testator’s formal intent, as evidenced by the text of the life insurance policy,
conflicts with the testator’s inferred intent to remove his former spouse as a
beneficiary. 225 Additionally, life insurance policies are usually transferred
directly and immediately to the named beneficiaries, irrespective of any
change in marital status. 226 In most cases, this automatic transfer would be
efficient, as a testator’s beneficiaries would be able to avoid the lengthy and
expensive probate process. 227 However, in the case of a divorced testator,
and with 75 million families relying on these crucial benefits, this could
prove disastrous. 228 Without a revocation statute in place, the rightful beneficiaries—the testator’s current family—are deprived of these crucial benefits at a vital time. 229
The policy reasons behind upholding the explicit terms of the life insurance policy are generally argued as follows: (1) an insured’s failure to
formally change his former spouse’s status is evidence of his intent to keep
his former spouse as a beneficiary; (2) the legislative and judicial systems
want to protect the third-party insurance company from being held liable for
breach of contract when it dispenses the policy’s proceeds to the wrong person; and (3) because a life insurance policy is technically a private contract
and a non-probate asset, probate courts should not have an active role in its
disbursement and should be bound to follow the contract terms. 230 However, these critiques have not stopped many states from adopting the UPC
revocation provisions as applied to life insurance policies.231 These states
are willing to accept the minor costs that arise from an automatic revocation
222. Raymond, supra note 94, at 401.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 405.
225. Id. at 401, 408–09.
226. Id. at 403–04.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 405; Facts About the U.S. Life Insurance Industry, supra note 220.
229. The American Council of Life Insurers report that 75 million families rely on the life insurance benefits derived from their primary policyholder. See Facts About the U.S. Life Insurance
Industry, supra note 220.
230. Raymond, supra note 94, at 409–11.
231. See supra note 48 for the list of states and territories that have enacted the current version
of the Uniform Probate Code in its entirety, including UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2001).
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in order to provide a policy that better effectuates testator intent, protects
the testator and his rightful beneficiaries, and prevents the testator’s mistaken belief that a divorce itself will automatically change the beneficiary status of his life insurance policy. 232 As Hailey H. David points out, “blood is
thicker than water,” and, more often than not, a divorced decedent would
prefer that his assets pass to his heirs, as opposed to his former spouse. 233
In addition, legislatures recognized that divorce constitutes “such a detrimental breakdown in a relationship that automatic alterations to a divorced
spouse’s testamentary plan [are] needed.” 234 The realization that testators
are often lax in revising their wills was also a driving force behind this
trend. 235
In her article, A Fair Presumption: Why Florida Needs a Divorce Revocation Statute for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, Suzanne Soliman, 236 notes that revoking a beneficiary’s status at the time of dissolution
is the “logical” solution.237 The dissolution provides a “definitive moment”
for identifying when the marriage—and by implication, the policy contract
and beneficiary designation—is terminated. 238 Furthermore, adopting the
Uniform Probate Code’s recommendations promotes consistency in the
whirlwind of present-day probate court decisions. 239
Without a revocation statute, the consequences of an inaccurate distribution of a testator’s life insurance policy are similar to the repercussions
faced when distributing a testator’s probate assets. However, life insurance
policies raise even more complicated issues than does the distribution of
232. Raymond, supra note 94, at 412, 416; see also Lynn, supra note 168, at 18 (discussing
the legislative assumption on which the statutory revocation is based—the testator’s failure to
change his or her will is a simple matter of oversight); Raymond, supra note 94, at 30 (discussing
the public interest in both minimizing litigation and adhering to testator intent); Soliman, supra
note 194, at 399, 418–19 (describing the need for Florida to adopt a revocation statute that resembles the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-804).
233. David, supra note 8, at 397.
234. Soliman, supra note 202, at 400; see also David, supra note 8, at 398 (pointing out that
the UPC revocation provisions “provide a default plan also based on common experience”).
235. Soliman, supra note 202, at 400; see also David, supra note 8, at 395, 410–11 (quoting
Mark Davis, Note, Life Insurance Beneficiaries and Divorce, 65 TEX. L. REV. 635, 653 (1987))
(pointing out that “the provisions of the UPC actually offer more protection to the divorced decedent” due to the deceased’s “forgetfulness, unexpected death, failure to comply with the prescribed procedures, or being the recipient of bad legal advice”).
236. Soliman, supra note 202.
237. Id. at 419–20.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 418–19. See also Lynn, supra note 174, at 3–6, where the author provides a
lengthy illustration of how a revocation statute that applied to all will substitutes would drastically
minimize litigation disputes. The author points out that, although it is possible that certain testators intend to permit their former spouse to take the proceeds of the policy dispute despite the divorce, the probability is not high; such a statute would intervene in the more “typical situation[]”
wherein the testator would intend to give the policy proceeds to the secondary beneficiary rather
than the divorced spouse. Id. at 15.
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probate assets because they implicate the additional dimension of private
contract law. The trend to extend revocation upon divorce statutes beyond
probate assets to include nonprobate assets, such as life insurance, which is
embraced and fully adopted by some states, has the potential for far greater
implications. 240 As such, although the push for a revocation upon divorce
statute as applied to life insurance policies offers a substantive analogy, the
greater purpose of this analogy is to provide a baseline comparison. If
some state legislatures are willing to venture into private contract law in order to better effectuate testator intent and promote justice, the remainder of
states without an express revocation upon divorce statute should at least
adopt the UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute as it applies to probate
matters.
III. CONCLUSION
The UPC’s revocation upon divorce statute provides a concrete and
objective device to interpret a decedent’s will in a confusing and emotionally driven situation—the probating of a loved one’s estate. The lack of
statutory guidance thus far has provided for inconsistent and contradictory
judicial decisions regarding the impact that a divorce has on a will. To resolve this problem, state legislatures should universally adopt the statutory
provisions set forth in the Uniform Probate Code’s revocation upon divorce
statute, Section 2-804. This would promote the efficient resolution of probate administration, protect the common testator who fails to change his
will upon divorce, and better effectuate the new intentions of the divorced
testator. Adoption of the UPC’s revocation upon divorce doctrine is warranted by multiple “principles of equity and due consideration of a decedent’s intent.” 241 Additionally, it is important that this solution be articulated in a statute rather than through judicial opinions. 242 This Comment has
explored the numerous complications that arise when a state fails to fully
adopt this clear bright-line standard, as well as provided a thorough analysis
of the positive implications of full adoption.
Enactment of the revocation upon divorce statute would not eliminate
testator choice. Rather, it merely shifts the “default rule” from one in which
a former spouse is likely to benefit from the decedent’s estate, to a new rule
that accounts for the change in circumstances and properly allocates the es-

240. See generally David, supra note 8; Lynn, supra note 174; Raymond, supra note 94; Soliman, supra note 202.
241. David, supra note 8, at 412. Moreover, when enacting legislation that affects probate
law, legislatures usually have two goals in mind: (1) properly effectuating and executing testator
intent and (2) providing efficient uniformity. Id. at 410.
242. Brogan, supra note 210, at 283 (nothing that “[a]ny standard, rule, or presumption offered as a solution to the problems in this area must be clear, unambiguous, and communicated
quickly and effectively.”).
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tate’s assets to the decedent’s current surviving loved ones.243 Testators
still have many options in order to provide for their former spouses if they
so wish. 244 Therefore, reversing this presumption would better effectuate
testator intent, as well as provide definite guidance in cases where the parties have not expressly stated their intentions. 245 With the modern marriage
and divorce trends in mind, all state legislatures should take note and recognize the importance and necessity of adopting this statute.

243. Soliman, supra note 202, at 427.
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. Brogan, supra note 210, at 281–82.

